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Abstract
Do Americans overestimate economic mobility? Using representative surveys of the public and local government ofﬁcials,
we assess claims of widespread misperceptions about economic mobility by measuring the accuracy of participants’
perceptions of both relative and absolute mobility. Republican members of the public and government ofﬁcials are more
optimistic than are Democrats about poor children’s chances of reaching the highest income quintile (relative mobility) and
earning more than their parents (absolute mobility). Democrats also rate race and family wealth as more important to
children’s chances than do Republicans. However, partisan tendencies to overestimate or underestimate mobility are
roughly symmetric despite differences in optimism; we only observe small and inconsistent differences in belief accuracy by
party for both the public and local ofﬁcials. Finally, accuracy is no greater for perceptions of state and local mobility than at
the national level.
Keywords
Economic mobility, misperceptions, partisanship

1. Introduction
Belief in the American Dream—the ideal that economic
mobility is uniquely achievable in the United States via hard
work—often exceeds reality. How much do Americans
overestimate economic mobility and which groups are most
likely to do so? Previous research shows that Americans
overestimate the probability of moving up in the income
distribution and that conservatives are most vulnerable to this
tendency (e.g., Alesina et al., 2018; Manza and Brooks 2020).
Correspondingly, Republicans are more likely to express
belief in people’s ability to get ahead by working hard than are
Democrats, who instead emphasize the role of structural
factors such as the education system and racial discrimination
in limiting mobility (Newport 2018; Horowitz et al., 2020).
Prior studies focus on public perceptions of relative
mobility at the national level. However, these partisan belief
differences about mobility might differ for perceptions of
absolute mobility—earning more than your parents—or for
contexts that are closer to people’s lived experiences. In

addition, past studies have not investigated the accuracy of
beliefs about mobility among local ofﬁcials, who are more
polarized than the public but also more sophisticated and
knowledgeable about policy issues.
Leveraging new data on relative and absolute mobility in
the United States and across states and local areas from
Chetty et al. (2014a), Chetty et al. (2014b), and Chetty et al.
(2017), we compare Americans’ perceptions of economic
mobility across income quintiles and generations at both the
national and state/local level in paired surveys of local
ofﬁcials and the general public.
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Our ﬁndings conﬁrm that Republicans have more optimistic perceptions of mobility in both relative and absolute
terms than Democrats and correspondingly rate race and
parental wealth as less important for a person’s likelihood of
getting ahead. These partisan differences hold among both
the public and local ofﬁcials. However, the partisan differences in optimism that we observe do not translate to
consistent differences in belief accuracy—Republicans
overestimate mobility and Democrats underestimate it in
roughly equal measure. Finally, the inaccuracy we observe
among the public in estimating mobility was not mitigated
by expertise (local ofﬁcials are not consistently better at
estimating mobility) or lived experience (respondents did
not have more accurate perceptions of mobility in their state
or local area compared to the United States as a whole).

2. Prior work and expectations
Americans are polarized in their views about social and
political issues. This polarization often extends from values
and public policy opinions to disagreement over facts (e.g.,
Frankovic 2016, 2018). Scholars attribute belief polarization and associated misperceptions to factors ranging from
elite cues (e.g., Zaller 1992) to directionally motivated
reasoning (e.g., Taber and Lodge 2006).
Political elites may not be immune to these pressures.
Local ofﬁcials tend to be more knowledgeable, which is
generally associated with greater belief accuracy (Gottfried
et al., 2013), but are also likely to have more polarized
opinions. The net effect of these competing pressures on
belief accuracy and polarization is not clear. One prior study
(Lee et al., 2020) found that local ofﬁcials hold more accurate beliefs than the public across several issues but that
this greater belief accuracy is not associated with reduced
partisan belief polarization.
Public beliefs may also differ at the local level where
knowledge is less dependent on elite cues and media
coverage. For instance, Rapeli (2014) ﬁnds that people’s
knowledge of local-level politics often differs from their
knowledge of national-level politics in Europe.
We examine these questions in the context of economic
mobility, where prior research indicates misperceptions are
common. Public opinion data shows that Americans overestimate relative economic mobility. Alesina, Stantcheva, and
Teso (2018) measure Americans’ perceptions of upward
national relative mobility and compare them to true values.
They ﬁnd that Americans (especially conservatives) overestimate mobility, a tendency that could affect Americans’
attitudes toward redistributive policies (Manza and Brooks
2020; Alesina et al., 2018).
This study contributes to prior research in four ways.
First, we investigate perceptions of relative mobility along
with absolute mobility within the same population. Second,
we measure and evaluate accuracy in addition to optimism
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to determine whether Democrats or Republicans are more
accurate or whether they are equally (in)accurate but in
different directions. Third, we use the same instrument to
survey both members of the public and local ofﬁcials, allowing us to compare their perceptions of both relative and
absolute mobility and their accuracy. Fourth, we asked
respondents for their perceptions of economic mobility in
both their local area or state and the United States to
compare these beliefs.
We expected that Republicans would have more optimistic assessments of economic mobility than Democrats.
As the party less in favor of government intervention to
ameliorate inequality, Republicans might need to overestimate economic mobility to justify their policy positions
(with Democrats needing to see low mobility to justify their
positions).1 We also expected that government ofﬁcials
would have more accurate beliefs than the American public
per Lee et al. (2020), who suggest that ofﬁcials have incentives to be more accurately informed. Additionally, we
expected both the public and government ofﬁcials to have
more accurate perceptions of economic mobility in their
local areas or states than the country as a whole. Finally, we
asked respondents which factors they believe are most
important for getting ahead. Given each party’s traditional
concerns, we expected Democrats to place greater emphasis
on the role of circumstances outside of people’s control such
as race and parental wealth than Republicans.

3. Methods and design
We conducted parallel surveys of the American public
(referred to as Americans or members of the public) and
local government ofﬁcials (referred to as local ofﬁcials).2
We collected data from 2956 respondents—556 local ofﬁcials surveyed by CivicPulse from March 31–May 18,
2020, and 2400 public respondents surveyed by YouGov
from March 12–April 1, 2020.3 The YouGov survey was a
non-probability online sample representative of United
States adults. The CivicPulse survey targeted local ofﬁcials
across the United States.4
Our survey measured perceptions of two types of economic
mobility. Relative mobility was measured using a graphic
illustration of a ladder (see Supplementary Appendix A, which
provides the full survey instrument). Respondents estimated
the chances that children born in one of the poorest 100
families out of 500 hypothetical families would grow up to be
in each income quintile at both the local and national level. We
measured perceptions of absolute mobility by asking respondents to estimate the percentage of children born around
1980, in either their state or the United States, who earned a
higher income at age 30 than their parents did at the same age.
Lastly, in an extension of a pilot study conducted in Michigan
(Institute for Public Policy and Social Research 2018), respondents were asked to rate the importance of various factors
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in getting ahead in life: race, parent wealth, education level,
hard work, and delaying having children until after marriage.
For each type of mobility, we consider two outcome
measures: optimism and accuracy. We ﬁrst calculate directional error measures that we label optimism, which is
the difference between perceived mobility and true mobility.
Higher values thus indicate greater optimism about mobility. We also calculate an absolute measure of error that we
label inaccuracy, which is the absolute value of the difference between the estimate and the true value. Higher
values of this measure represent more inaccurate beliefs
about mobility (which could be either underestimated or
overestimated).
Our measures of true relative mobility at the local and
national level are derived from Chetty et al. (2014b) and
Chetty et al. (2014a) (we match respondents to commuting
zone by zip code). Levels of absolute mobility at the state
and national level are derived from Chetty et al. (2017).5

4. Results
We divide our results into three sections: optimism about
economic mobility, inaccuracy in perceptions of economic
mobility, and perceptions about which factors are important
for getting ahead. Within the optimism and inaccuracy
sections, we use three sets of comparisons: by partisanship,
by government ofﬁcials versus the public, and by local/state
area versus national. We deﬁne relative mobility as the
respondent’s estimated likelihood that someone born into
the lowest income quintile will move into the highest income quintile (Q1 → Q5).6 Respondent perceptions are
compared against the true values.7

4.1. Optimism
Consistent with prior research, we ﬁnd that the American
public is overly optimistic about relative economic mobility
(though not by a large margin). The public estimates the rate of
national Q1 → Q5 mobility as 10.6%, an overestimate relative
to the true value of 7.5%. By contrast, the public is slightly too
pessimistic about absolute economic mobility at the national
level. The public expects 46.6% of children to earn more than
their parents, which is a bit less than the true value of 50%.8
To understand these results better, we examine how
optimism in perceptions of economic mobility differs by
partisanship and whether the respondent is a local ofﬁcial or a
member of the public at the national and local/state level. In
these analyses, we calculate optimism as the (signed) difference
between perceived and true values. Higher values thus represent greater perceived relative or absolute mobility. Values
above zero indicate perceptions exceeding the true value while
those below zero indicate perceptions below the true value.
Figure 1(a) shows perceptions of the probability of
moving from the bottom to the top income quintile (Q1 →

Figure 1. Optimism in perceptions of economic mobility. (a)
Relative mobility. (b) Absolute mobility.

Q5) compared to the true value (i.e., relative mobility).
Figure 1(b) shows perceptions of the likelihood of a person
exceeding their parents’ income at the same age compared
to the true value (i.e., absolute mobility). Local refers to
commuting zone. Data for true values are sourced from
Chetty et al. (2014a) and Chetty et al. (2017).
Our ﬁndings are summarized in Figure 1(a) (partisan
optimism about relative mobility in respondents’ local area
and the United States) and Figure 1(b) (partisan optimism in
perceptions of state and national absolute mobility). The
four points in each row of both graphs correspond to the
perceived levels of mobility relative to the true values
among local ofﬁcials and the public: Democratic local
ofﬁcials (blue squares), Republican local ofﬁcials (red
squares), Democratic members of the public (blue triangles), and Republican members of the public (red triangles).
As Figure 1 indicates, Republicans are consistently more
optimistic than are Democrats both within the public and
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among ofﬁcials. Consider the ﬁrst row of Figure 1(a). On
average, Democratic members of the public estimated that
9.2 children born into the poorest 100 families would make
it into the richest 100 families (out of 500) while Republican
members of the public estimated that 13 of those children
would make it into that group. Both exceeded the true value
of 7.5%, but Republican members of the public were more
optimistic. The corresponding blue triangle in the graph for
Democrats in the public appears at 0.017 (the signed difference of 0.092–0.075), while the red triangle for Republicans in the public appears at 0.065 (the signed
difference of 0.130–0.075). Democratic and Republican
ofﬁcials showed a similar divide, though both underestimated mobility. Democratic ofﬁcials estimated it at 3.2%
and with Republicans estimating 6.5%, so they are plotted
as blue and red squares, respectively, at 0.043 and 0.010.
Similar patterns of greater Republican optimism are evident
for estimates of local relative mobility and for absolute mobility
at both the state and national level.
These differences are conﬁrmed in statistical tests. As
Supplementary Appendix Table B1 indicates, Democratic
members of the public were less optimistic about relative
mobility than their Republican counterparts at the national
( 0.042, p < 0.005) and local ( 0.047, p < 0.005) level.
Partisan differences in perceptions of absolute mobility are
also signiﬁcant. Per Supplementary Appendix Table B1,
Democrats are less optimistic about national ( 0.110, p <
0.005) and state absolute mobility ( 0.113, p < 0.005) than
are Republicans. These partisan differences are mirrored for
local ofﬁcials.9
We observe a signiﬁcant difference between local ofﬁcials and the public in perceptions of Americans’ chance of
moving up from the ﬁrst to the ﬁfth quintile. Members of the
public from both parties were more optimistic about relative
mobility than were local ofﬁcials. For absolute mobility,
however, Republican ofﬁcials were the most optimistic.10
Finally, we ﬁnd no evidence that people hold more or less
optimistic beliefs about economic mobility in their local
area/state compared to national economic mobility.11

4.2. Inaccuracy
We also estimated models of inaccuracy for both relative
and absolute economic mobility, which measure how far
Democrats and Republicans are from the true values (i.e.,
the absolute value of the difference). We illustrate these
results in Figure 2(a), which shows partisan inaccuracy for
perceptions of relative mobility, and Figure 2(b), which
shows partisan inaccuracy for perceptions of absolute
mobility.12 Supplementary Appendix Table B2 models
predictors of inaccurate perceptions of relative and absolute
mobility at the national or local/state level.
In contrast with the conventional narrative that inaccuracy of American perceptions of economic mobility is
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Figure 2. Inaccuracy of perceptions of economic mobility. (a)
Relative mobility. (b) Absolute mobility.

driven by Republican overestimation of economic mobility,
we ﬁnd generally similar levels of inaccuracy for perceptions of economic mobility between parties. In fact, we ﬁnd
some evidence that Republicans may actually be more
accurate in their perceptions of absolute mobility.
Figure 2(a) and Supplementary Appendix Table B2
demonstrate that Democratic and Republican ofﬁcials and
members of the public did not signiﬁcantly differ in the
accuracy of their perceptions of relative mobility (Q1 →
Q5). When we consider estimates of relative mobility across
all ﬁve income quintiles using Brier and logarithmic (log)
scores, we also ﬁnd no systematic partisan difference in
accuracy (see Supplementary Appendix Table B4).13
For absolute mobility, a consistent pattern does not
emerge. Supplementary Appendix Table B2 indicates that
Republican members of the public were slightly more
accurate for national (0.018, p < 0.05) and state absolute
mobility (0.019, p < 0.05) than Democratic members of the
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accurate in their perceptions of relative mobility across parties
at the local and national levels (p < 0.005 in both cases).
Overall, we ﬁnd no evidence that people hold more
accurate beliefs about relative or absolute mobility in their
local area or state versus the national level. (Indeed, some
evidence even suggests greater inaccuracy in relative mobility at the local level; see Supplementary Appendix Tables
B5 and B6.)
Figure 2(a) shows the inaccuracy of local ofﬁcials and
members of the public’s perceptions of the probability of
moving from the bottom to the top income quintile (Q1 →
Q5). Figure 2(b) shows the inaccuracy of local ofﬁcials and
members of the public’s perceptions of the likelihood of a
person exceeding their parents’ income at the same age
compared to the true value. Local refers to commuting zone.
Data for true values are sourced from Chetty et al. (2014a)
and Chetty et al. (2017).

4.3. Factors in getting ahead

Figure 3. Perceived importance of various factors in getting
ahead. (a) Local ofﬁcials. (b) Public.

We also asked respondents to rate the importance of ﬁve
factors—race, parent wealth, education, delaying having
children until marriage, and hard work—in getting ahead in
life. We then segmented the results by partisanship and
graphed the average ratings for both members of the public
(Figure 3(a)) and local ofﬁcials (Figure 3(b)). Democrats
ranked uncontrollable factors, such as race and parent wealth,
as more important for getting ahead than their Republican
counterparts. These two factors showed the largest partisan
differences for both local ofﬁcials and members of the public,
with Democrats rating them above fairly important on average and Republican rating them as less than fairly important
on average. Furthermore, Democratic members of the public
ranked more mutable factors, like delaying having children
and working hard, as less important for getting ahead than did
Republicans.14
Figure 3(a) shows mean local ofﬁcial perceptions of the
importance of various factors in getting ahead in life, while
Figure 3(b) shows mean public perceptions of the importance of the same factors. The factors race and parent wealth
exhibit the greatest party mean differences for both the
public and local ofﬁcials.

5. Conclusion
public. As for local ofﬁcials, the difference in accuracy
between Democratic local ofﬁcials’ and Republican local
ofﬁcials’ estimates of absolute mobility was not signiﬁcant.
As such, partisans were approximately equally inaccurate in
their estimates of mobility; in the instances in which they
were not, Republican estimates were slightly more accurate.
We also ﬁnd relatively similar levels of inaccuracy between local ofﬁcials and members of the public for their
perceptions of absolute mobility. However, elites were more

Consistent with prior evidence, we ﬁnd that Americans
overestimate relative mobility and Republicans are more
optimistic than Democrats about children’s chances, but our
results challenge and expand these ﬁndings in important
ways. First, though Republicans have more optimistic
perceptions of both relative and absolute economic mobility
than Democrats, we did not ﬁnd that one party held consistently more accurate beliefs. Second, greater expertise
and lived experience did not consistently improve the
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accuracy of people’s beliefs—we found only mixed evidence that local ofﬁcials have more accurate perceptions
than the public and no indication that respondents have
more accurate perceptions about mobility in their state/local
area. We did conﬁrm that partisan differences extend to
explanations for mobility, however: Democrats perceive the
uncontrollable factors of race and parental wealth to be more
important for getting ahead than do Republicans.
Overall, these results complicate scholarly narratives
about inaccurate perceptions of economic mobility. The
public overestimates relative mobility but underestimates
absolute mobility on average; both approach the correct
answers in aggregate. Moreover, partisan differences in
perceptions at both the elite and public levels do not correspond to systematic differences in belief accuracy. Republicans tend to overestimate relative mobility while
Democrats tend to underestimate it. Correspondingly, Republicans generally think Americans can overcome disadvantaged family backgrounds but Democrats are more
likely to think immutable factors constrain poor children.
Finally, notions about what might reduce partisan differences or increase belief accuracy are unsupported—neither
local knowledge nor government experience is consistently
associated with signiﬁcantly greater accuracy.
Given that we examine cross-sectional descriptive data,
we cannot be conﬁdent about causal order. Republican
partisanship may lead to more optimistic perceptions of
economic mobility due to differences in information exposure (e.g., more rags-to-riches narratives) or policy preferences (e.g., greater opposition to redistributive policies).
Alternatively, belief in the traditional bootstrap narrative may
lead citizens to identify with the more conservative party.
Similar potential explanations apply for Democrats. Some
may wish to justify their preference for government intervention in the economy or a strong safety net, while others
may have been motivated to support the more liberal party
due to their perceptions of low levels of mobility. More
complex causal paths are also possible. For instance, some
people may be more likely than others to believe in and need
to defend a just world (Jost et al., 2004), which would lead
them toward support for the Republican Party and greater
perceptions of economic mobility.
The ﬁndings also have other limitations. First, we use
local government ofﬁcials to represent political elites; these
ofﬁcials may not be representative of elected ofﬁcials at
higher levels of government such as state legislators or
members of Congress. Second, we cannot control respondent effort. It is possible that some respondents guessed
randomly or put little thought into answering questions
about mobility, which asked them to estimate quantities
with which they were likely unfamiliar and which may be
sensitive to question wording or context effects (Swan et al.,
2017). Third, innumeracy may have also limited respondents’
ability to translate their perceptions of economic mobility
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into our speciﬁc quantities of interest. Survey fatigue could
similarly have resulted in respondents simply repeating
similar or identical answers for both state/local and national mobility.
Nonetheless, these results provide valuable new evidence on perceptions of economic mobility in the United
States. Americans do not uniformly overestimate mobility.
Instead, the seemingly ubiquitous narrative of the American
Dream has become yet another issue shaped by polarized
partisan differences in public and ofﬁcial beliefs.
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Notes
1. For instance, 2018 Gallup polls (Newport, 2018) reported that
86% of Republicans were satisﬁed with the ability to get
ahead, compared to only 50% of Democrats.
2. Replication data and code are publicly available in the Research & Politics Dataverse at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/
dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/Y9DBRN.
3. In our main analysis, we combined the two survey samples
without adjusting them using population weights. However,
we report weighted models of inaccuracy and optimism using
survey weights provided by YouGov and CivicPulse in
Supplementary Appendix B as robustness checks—see
Supplementary Appendix Tables B17–B20.
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4. For a more detailed description of CivicPulse’s methodology
and samples, see Lee et al. (2020).
5. Respondents were asked for their perceptions of absolute
mobility for children born around 1980, which corresponds
directly to the Chetty et al. (2014b) and Chetty et al. (2014a)
measures. By contrast, no year referent was provided for
relative mobility. However, Chetty et al. (2014a) ﬁnds these
values are stable over time, suggesting that our measures were
still accurate for respondents at the time of the survey.
6. Analogous results for perceptions of relative mobility for other
quintiles (i.e., Q1 → Q1, Q1 → Q2, Q1 → Q3, and Q1 → Q4)
are provided in Supplementary Appendix B.
7. Perceptions of local relative mobility were largely similar to
those of national mobility and were not responsive to actual
local differences in mobility (see Supplementary Appendix
Tables B12 and B14). However, perceptions of state absolute
mobility were responsive to actual differences in the respondent’s state (see Supplementary Appendix Tables B13
and B14).
8. Importantly, there is signiﬁcant dispersion in these estimates
but the public is relatively accurate on average, reﬂecting the
wisdom of the crowd when aggregating estimates (e.g., Lee
et al., 2020).
9. Democrat-Republican differences in absolute mobility are
larger for local ofﬁcials than the public at both the national and
state level (p < 0.005 for each). Partisan differences do not
signiﬁcantly differ between local ofﬁcials and the public for
relative mobility.
10. Differences in beliefs between local ofﬁcials and the public
may be due to demographic differences rather than unique
preferences or psychological characteristics (Kertzer, 2020).
We pool our public and elite data and control for those factors
to the extent possible.
11. As further analyses conducted in Supplementary Appendix
Tables B10 and B11 show, we found mixed or insigniﬁcant
results when comparing optimism for perceptions of local
mobility with optimism for perceptions of national mobility
(for both relative and absolute mobility).
12. We note that the values in Figures 1(a) and 2(a) differ because
we measured accuracy at the individual level rather than in the
aggregate (i.e., we took the absolute values of individual responses and then calculated mean accuracy by party and respondent type). As a result, the values in Figure 2(a) are not the
absolute value of those in Figure 1(a). To illustrate this point,
consider the example of Republican ofﬁcials, who underestimate relative mobility on average. At the individual level, some
individual Republican ofﬁcials overestimate relative mobility
and some underestimate relative mobility. Because we ﬁrst take
the absolute value of individual estimates before averaging, the
levels of accuracy in Figure 2(a) reﬂect this greater individuallevel variability. This same principle applies to the differences
between Figures 1(b) and 2(b).
13. Speciﬁcally, Supplementary Appendix Table B4 reports inaccuracy models that include Brier scores and a logarithmic
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scoring rule, proper scoring rules for discrete random variable
forecasts (e.g., Brandt et al., 2014; Chang et al., 2016), as well
as Q1 → Q1, the respondent’s estimated likelihood that
someone born into the lowest income quintile will stay in the
lowest income quintile. Supplementary Appendix Table B5
shows a relative mobility inaccuracy model that includes local
mobility perceptions as a covariate with no interactions to
estimate the unconditional inaccuracy difference; this model
also includes Q1 → Q1, Q1 → Q2, Q1 → Q3, Q1 → Q4, and
Q1 → Q5. Supplementary Appendix Table B6 shows a similar
inaccuracy model for absolute mobility: it similarly includes
state mobility perceptions as a covariate but no interactions to
estimate the unconditional inaccuracy difference. Finally,
Supplementary Appendix Tables B7 and 8 show inaccuracy
models for relative and absolute mobility, respectively, interacting local and state mobility perceptions with partisanship
and ofﬁcial versus public status.
14. However, controlling for differences in the perceived importance of these factors does not eliminate partisan gaps in
optimism—see Supplementary Appendix Table B9.
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